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JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
JOHN P. BULLINGTON*
The recently decided case of Hess v. Pawloski,1 though confined
in its decision to substituted service upon individuals, is not without
implications and repercussions in the law governing jurisdiction over
foreign corporations, for as Justice Gray said in Barrow Steamship
Co. v. Kane :2
"The constant tendency of judicial decisions in modern times has
been in the direction of putting corporations on the same footing as
natural persons in regard to jurisdiction of suits by or against
them."8
The decision extending the power of the state to bring back into
its jurisdiction an individual having there done certain acts, with-
out meeting the constitutional requirements of Pennoyer v. Neff4 and
Riverside Mills v. Menefee,5 suggests a reconsideration of the Su-
preme Court's decisions with respect to service on foreign corpor-
ations.
In the early days of our law the corporation was regarded by
the courts as a sort of metaphysical abstraction; a creature only of
the law; something above and beyond the tangible group. The idea
was best expressed by Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Auguata v.
Earle :6
"It is very true, that a corporation can have no legal existence
out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it was created. It
* Member of the Bar, Houston, Texas.
' Hess v. Pawloski, 47 S. Ct. 632 (1927), upholding Massachusetts statute
relating to service of process on nonresident motorist by delivery of copy of
process to registrar or his successor in office, and providing for mailing of copy
thereof by registered mail to the nonresident. It is to be regretted that Justice
Butler cites with seeming approval the case of Flexner v. Farson, 249 U. S. 289,
a case which has been almost universally condemned, and which constitutes a
constitutional barrier to many procedural reforms. It is believed that the best
interests of all concerned would be served if the doing of business within a
State were allowed by the Supreme Court as a basis for jurisdiction of the State
courts, whether that business be done by a corporation, association, partnership,
natural person, or any other thing or being capable of carrying on business as
an entity. See the able paper of Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30 Harv. Law
Rev. 676.
2 (1898) 170 U. S. 100.
'Ibid., p. 106.
(1877) 95 U. S. 714.
'(1915) 237 U. S. 189.
4 (1839) 13 Pet. 519.
[147]
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exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and
where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the
corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its
creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. But although
it must live and have its being in that state alone, yet it does not by
any means follow that its existence there will not be recognized in
other places; and its residence in one state creates no insuperable
objection to its power of contracting in another. It is indeed a mere
artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a person, for certain
purposes in contemplation of law, and has been recognized as such
by the decisions of this court."
This idea, though seemingly now at least partially abandoned by
the Supreme Court,e" has not been without influence in shaping the
decisions of that court, even in the more recent cases. The corpor-
ation is still something different from a physical person for purposes
of service of process, and it will be the purpose of this paper to
attempt to discover in what respects the corporation is to be likened
to an individual for that purpose. The decisions of state courts will
be referred to only as illustrative, or as bearing upon moot questions.
The Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the question, 7 so that the
governing rules, if any can be found, must be culled from its
decisions.
Several theories have been put forward as forming the basis for
the jurisdiction of a state court over a foreign corporation. Most of
them have required exceptions and fictions to support the structure
of cases built upon them. Other theories attempt to find an all-
inclusive rule which will include every decided case, and at the same
time serve as a yardstick for the proper measurement of future cases.
Whether any such all inclusive rules are necessary, or even desirable,
will be later discussed.
It having been early determined that the corporation could exert
acts outside the state of its incorporation through its agents and by
the rule of comity,7s it seemed not a far step to hold that the cor-
poration might be sued in the state when it was there operating
'" It was early thought that a state statute authorizing a corporation to do
business in the state had the effect of giving that corporation a sort of quasi-
local character. See the remarks of Justice Swayne in Railroad Co. v. Harris
(U. S. 1870) 12 Wall. 65, 82. See also Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKib-
ben (1916), 243 U. S. 264, 265; Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923), 261
U. S. 171. For an expression of the modern view of the Supreme Court on the
point see the remarks of Brandeis, J., in Bank of America v. Whitney Bank,
quoted in Note 19a, infra.'
'Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibben (1916), 243 U. S. 264.
'" Bank of Augusta v. Earle (U. S. 1839) 13 Pet. 519.
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through its agents. There was a considerable conflict in the state
courts as to whether this could or could not be done, and it was
generally supposed that the common law provided no means of serv-
ing process on a foreign corporation. Statutes were passed for the
purpose of remedying this defect and authorizing service upon the
agents of the foreign corporation.S The question finally came before
the Supreme Court in the case of LaFayette Insurance Co. v. French9
where the Supreme Court's first theory of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations was enunciated by Justice Curtis. It being postulated
that the state could exclude the foreign corporationO it followed
that it might allow the corporation to enter subject to conditions. If
the state made one of those conditions a subjection to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the state, such condition was perfectly proper, pro-
vided that the condition was not calculated to deprive the corporation
of due process of law,"1 and the foreign corporation by coming into
the state and doing business there must be deemed to have consented
to those conditions, for by such consent alone it could have legally
transacted business in the state. In other words, even though the
corporation was still regarded as absent from the state, jurisdiction
could be obtained because of a previous implied consent. The ob-
jections to this theory are many. In the first place, it is incredible
that a corporation still be regarded in law as non-existent outside the
jurisdiction creating it. It is notorious that there is not always any
necessary connection between the state where the corporation holds
its charter, and that where it carries on its business. To say that a
Delaware corporation whose only business is the operation of a
factory in Illinois exists only ih Delaware is absurd.
If the consent of the foreign corporation be a real one (evidenced
by actions which speak more forcefully than words), as has been
argued by Mr. Beale,12 then it would follow that any service pre-
scribed by the statute of the state would be sufficient to gain the
approval of the Supreme Court. That, however, is not the case,
' Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitu-
tional Law, Cambridge, 1918, pp. 77-81.
' (U. S. 1855) 18 How. 404.
Paul v. Virginia (U. S. 1868), 8 Wall. 168. Generally see, Henderson,
op. cit., Chap. VI.
See the remarks of Curtis, J. in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French (U. S.
1815), 18 How. 404, 407. See also Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Carr (1926),
47 Sup. Ct. 179.
As to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions see Henderson, op. cit.,
Chap. VIII.
'Beale, Foreign Corporations, Sec. 266.
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for in a series of decisions following LaFayette Inmrance Co. v.
French, supra, it was determined that in order for the statute to meet
due process, two essentials must be provided for:
(1) The company must be doing business in the state at the time
of service.13
(2) And the agent served must bear a sufficiently close relation
to the corporation.
1 4
Further, the implied consent is limited to causes of action arising
out of business done in the state.' 41 It is therefore impossible to
sustain any theory of real consent. Judge Hand, in the case of
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,'5 frankly recog-
,nizes the fictitious character of the consent, and says that the court,
in causes of action arising within the state, simply implies the con-
sent because it is reasonable and just to do so. If the Constitution
still insists upon personal service within the state as essential to
jurisdiction, and if the Supreme Court still considers that a corpor-
ation can have no existence outside the state 'of its creation, then the
theory of Judge Hand means that the court may avoid an acknowl-
edged constitutional limitation by the simple expedient of assuming a
fact which it knows is untrue.' 0
There is yet another theory upon which jurisdiction might be
based, but which means that the idea that a corporation cannot exist
outside the state creating it must be cast overboard. The theory is
that a corporation, by doing business in a state, is "present" there,
"Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French (U. S. 1815), 18 How. 404; St. Clair v.
Cox (1882), 106 U. S. 350; Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley
(1899), 172 U. S. 602; Conley v. Matheison. Alkali Works (1903), 190 U. S.
406; Kendall v. Automatic Loom Co. (1905), 198 U. S. 477; Green v. C. B. &
Q. Ry. (1907), 205 U. S. 530; Comnercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis
(1909), 213 U. S. 245; Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co. (1910),
218 U. S. 573; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (1914), 234 U. S. 579;
Riverside Mills v. Menefee (1915), 237 U. S. 189; Washington-Virginia Ry. v.
Real Estate Trust (1915), 238 U. S. 185; Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. Mc-
Kibben (1916), 243 U. S. 264; Toledo Railways etc. Co. v. Hill (1917), 244
U. S. 49; Meisukas v. Greenough Coal Co. (1917), 244 U. S. 54; Chipmatn v.
Jeffery Co. (1920), 251 U. S. 373; Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis-Brown
Co. (1922), 260 U. S. 516; Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923), 261 U.
S. 171; Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy (1924), 267 U. S. 333; James-
Dickinson Manufacturing Co. v. Harry (1927), 47 Sup. Ct. 308.
" Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley (1899), 172 U. S. 602,
610; Lumberman's Insurance Co. v. Meyer (1905), 197 U. S. 407; Philadelphia
6. Reading Ry. v. McKibben (1916), 243 U. S. 264, 265; Lafayette Insurance
Co. v. French (1855), 18 How. 404, 407.
,,a See note 69 infra.
'5 (D. C., S. D., N. Y., 1915), 222 Fed. 148.
"Cf. Henderson, op. cit., p. 96.
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and therefore amenable to process as any other legal person within
the jurisdiction.' 7 The English courts have found no difficulty in
taking jurisdiction over a foreign corporation doing business in the
realm, by service upon one of the chief agents of the corporation
there.18 This is on the theory that the corporation is there and thus
amenable to service through its agent. At least one American case' 9
is seemingly to be explained on no other ground, and there have been
dicta in Supreme Court cases, particularly recent ones, supporting the
theory.19'
Though this theory seems more satisfactory than either the real
consent or the implied consent theories, it has not escaped criticism.
T E.g. C6rdoza, J., in Tauza v. Susquehana Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 267:
"We are here to say, not whether the business is such that the corporation
may be prevented from being here, but whether its business is such that it is
here. If in fact it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure
of permanence and continuity, then, whether its business is interstate or local,
it is within the jurisdiction of our courts."
The theory is also supported by Cahill in 30 Harv. Law Rev. 676, cited
supra, note 1; and Henderson, op. cit., Chap. V.
' Westlake, Private'International Law, 7th ed., London, 1925, p. 392. See
especially Nutter v. Messageries Maritimes, 54 L. J. (Q. B.) 527; Newby v.
Van Oppen & Colt's Patent Firearms Co. (1872), 7 L. R. (Q. B.) 293; Haggin
v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 519; Insurance Co. v.
Societa di Navigazione etc. (1914), 111 L. T. 97; and Dunlop Tyre Co. v.
Actien. far Motor etc. (1902), 86 L. T. 427. The rule is the same even though
the cause of action arose abroad. Logan v. Bank of Scotland (1904), 2 K. B.
495; Lhoneux, Limon et Cie v. Hongkong Banking Co. (1886), 33 Chan.
Div. 446.
" Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane (1898), 170 U. S. 100.
"a ".. . The other question as to the presence of the corporation within the
jurisdiction of the court in which it was sued raises more difficulty. A long line
of decisions in this court has established that in order to render a corporation
amenable to service of process in a foreign jurisdiction it must appear that the
corporation is transacting business in that district to such an extent as to sub-
ject it to the jurisdiction and laws thereof. . . ." Day, J. in St. Louis, S. W.
Ry. v. Alexander (1913), 227 U. S. 218, 226.
, . * A foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce personal liabil-
ity, in the absence of consent, only if it is doing business within the State in
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present
there ... ." Brandeis, J. in Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibben (1916),
243 U. S. 264.
" . . . The sole question for decision is whether, at the time of the service of
process, the defendant was doing business within the State of New York in
such a manner and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that it was
present there." Brandeis, J., in Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis-Brown Co.
(1922), 260 U. S. 516, 517.
... The jurisdiction taken of foreign corporations, in the absence of
statutory requirement or express consent, does not rest on the fiction of con-
structive presence, like qui facit per alium, facit per se. It flows from the
fact that the corporation itself does business in the State or district in-such
a manner and to such an extent that its actual presence there is established
. . ." Brandeis, J., in Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923), 261 U. S.
171, 173.
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The theory of presence, it is said, 20 cannot support the cases which
allow service upon an agent, as to causes of action arising within
the state, even though the corporation has withdrawn from the
jurisdiction. 21 These cases, it may be answered, have nothing to do
with any conflict of laws rule, but are concerned entirely with the
police power of the state. Hess v. Pawloski has not destroyed the
conflicts rule as to natural persons; it has simply established that in
proper cases the state may exercise its police power to overcome a
conflict of laws rule, even though that rule may have previously had
the protection of the due process clause of the Constitution. We
would not cast aside the general rule that private property may not
be taken without "just" and "previous" compensation simply be-
cause we have learned from experience that the state can in certain
cases do so. We state the normal rule and explain the legalized non-
observance of it as an exercise of the police power.
A second, and stronger, objection is that the "presence" of the
corporation is a fiction and therefore open to the same objections as
the consent theory.22 When it is replied that the corporation can as
well be "present" in the foreign state as in its home state, the critic
simply answers that presence is not the basis of jurisdiction-the
point he set out to prove.23 A better answer, it is submitted, would
have been to attack the "presence" of the corporation anywhere.
Certainly if it be admitted that a corporation is "present" in any real
sense in the state to which it owes its charter it may, by doing the
same acts in another state, become just as fully "present" there.
Whether or not a corporation can be conceived as. "present" any-
where will depend largely upon one's turn of mind, and it would
therefore be unwise to dismiss as impossible the idea of a corpor-
ation being present anywhere. The writer has no trouble in visual-
izing the corporation as "present" in several different places at the
same time, but must admit the possibility of an entirely rational
difference of opinion on the point. Much will depend upon one's
" Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident Motorists, 39 Harv. Law Rev.
56, 577.
'The only Supreme Court case cited by Mr. Scott is Mutual Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n. v. Phelps (1903), 190 U. S. 147. In that case the court found that
the corporation was still doing business in the State (at p. 157). Cf. Hunter v.
Mutual Reserve Life Ass'n. (1910), 218 U. S. 573. Since the article appeared,
however, the Supreme Court has decided a case supportable on no other ground.
American Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co. (1927), 47 Sup. Ct. 355.
, Scott, article cited, p. 576.
" Ibid., p. 577.
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definition of a corporation. If it be thought of as an abstract, meta-
physical creature of the law, nowhere visible to the naked eye, it is
futile to talk in terms of "presence." The very word "presence" has
become so attached to the actual physical person that its use in an-
other connection is bound to cause dissent. The writer is inclined to
look upon a corporation as the sum total of a group of individual
persons legally bound together for the same purposes. The employee
would seem as much a part of the corporation as the stockholder or
the officer. When the activity of the group as such is visible, it is
not difficult to believe that the corporation is present, i.e. manifesting
its existence in a manner capable of being perceived by the senses.
Certainly the writer would not admit that the presence of the cor-
poration is a pure fiction. What he does admit is that there can be
a reasonable difference of opinion as to the connotation of the words
"corporation" and "presence." The statement so often heard that
"two and two make four" might be challenged as a fiction if we
desired to carry verbal criticism to its extreme. Certainly the "two
and two" statement is not actually demonstrable as an abstract state-
ment. It gains its validity through the general agreement that two
and two will be considered as always totalling four. Less agreement
might be had on the statement that 2 x 1 = 2. It is even algebraically
demonstrable that 1 = 0. When we leave the so-called exact sci-
ences, terminology becomes less and less accurate, until it is well
always to agree in argument upon fairly definite meanings of terms
frequently used.24 If it be said that certain activities by individuals,
which seem to be part of what one person calls a corporation, is not
a manifestation of the corporation's "presence," then an agreement
upon the presence or non-presence of the supposed corporation can
be reached only by an agreement upon the terms used.
The Supreme Court on several occasions has said that a corpor-
ation may be "present" in a state by doing a sufficient amount of
business there to manifest such "presence. ' '2 4a To this it has been
said that a corporation cannot be "present" by doing business because
an individual cannot be "present" by doing business.2 5 Here again
only the purely personal connotation of the word is considered. Why
not take as an analogy the tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad-
' See Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law. Reprinted from the
Johns Hopkins Alumni Magazine, March, 1927, Vol. XV, No. 3.
See note 19' supra.
' Scott, article cited, p. 576.
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they cross several states and are "present" in each of them, yet are
so welded together as to make a continuing whole. Would it be
said that the track was "present" only in the state of its beginning?
Since the "presence" theory may be acceptable to some without
convincing all, it may be worth while to look further for a satisfac-
tory theory. Mr. Fead, after criticising the presence theory, offers
as the soundest rule-
"that a foreign corporation by doing business within a state submits
itself to the laws of that state which may be reasonably applied to
it, and to the jurisdiction of the state so far as the laws of the state
regulating the exercise of that jurisdiction are reasonable." 2
It would seem that Mr. Fead, in his view that the corporation, by
doing business in a state, "submits" to the reasonable jurisdiction
of the state, is guilty of the same fault as he properly criticizes in
the consent theory. Little difference is perceived in implying a sub-
mission on the part of the corporation and implying a consent. In
either case the major postulate seems to be that any jurisdiction ex-
ercised by the state over a foreign corporation is extraordinary, and
that some actual or implied manifestation of willing is necessary on
the part of the corporation. Suppose the corporation refuses to
submit-what then? There is just as little evidence of submission
on the part of the corporation as of its consent to the jurisdiction.
The many cases which corporations have carried to the Supreme
Court are evidence that they do not always submit. The state, it
is submitted, imposes its jurisdiction in all cases-on natural persons
and corporations alike-and the only remedy open to the corporation
is to invoke external pressure upon the state through the Supreme
Court to cause the imposition to be removed.
More recently, Professor Scott has offered the rule that-
" . if a state may, without violating any constitutional limitation,
forbid the doing of certain kinds of acts within the state unless and
until the person doing such acts has consented to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of such acts,
the state may validly provide that the doing of such acts shall subject
him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to such causes
of action ."' 27
Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 24 Mich. Law Rev. 633, 637.
"Scott, article cited, p. 585.
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This, in effect, is the rule stated by the Supreme Court for de-
termining the proper limits of the state's power to tax. In Provi-
dent Savings Ass'n. v. Kentucky, 28 Justice Hughes said:
"And we cannot doubt that the question whether the state is taxing
the corporation for a privilege not granted, that is, whether the acts
done by the corporation at the time to which the tax relates are of
such a nature as to subject it to local authority on the ground that
it is doing acts which can only be done with the permission of that
authority, is a Federal question."
'29
While the rule suggested by Professor Scott would include most
cases, it is doubtful if cases like International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky30 would fall within it. There the business done was purely
interstate in character, and the state could not constitutionally have
forbidden the doing of those acts, yet the state courts were allowed
to take jurisdiction as to causes of action arising out of those acts.
So in the case of Provident Savings Assn. v. Kentucky,3 1 though it
was held that the state could not constitutionally forbid the insur-
ance company from continuing policies already written,3 1 4 the juris-
diction of the state courts as to causes of. action arising out of such
business was upheld in Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Spratley.3 2 It appears, then, that the state may exercise a certain
jurisdiction over foreign corporations as to acts it could not consti-
tutionally prevent.
Beyond this, it is believed that the formula suggested says noth-
ing more than that the state may exercise jurisdiction in a manner
which would otherwise be unconstitutional if the action falls within
the police power. The formula suggested tends to cloud the real
question, and to insinuate a pervading simplicity which does not
exist. The formula proposed seems an unnecessarily roundabout
manner of getting at the heart of a doubtful case-i.e. is this assump-
tion of extraordinary jurisdiction within the police power of the
state ?
It is believed that a great deal of harm has been done to the
orderly development of the law in this particular by the continuing
idea of corporate personality, and the resultant attempt to apply to
(1915) 239 U. S. 103.
SIbid., p. 112.
(1914) 234 U. S. 579.
Supra, note 28.
Cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), 165 U. S. 578.
(1899) 172 U. S. 602.
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it, not mere analogies to the natural person, but terms and rules
which have always had a purely personal connotation. 3 As has
been noted above, the theory of corporate personality has resulted in
the application of the personal term "presence" to it with the result
that the cases seem comprehensible to some and not to others. Surely
personality is not a necessary adjunct of the corporation. The courts
when adopting that theory could as well have adopted some other.
The view that the life of the corporation depends always upon the
continued life of the creating state is belied in fact by the recent
cases asserting jurisdiction over Russian corporations despite the
fact that they had been dissolved by the Soviet government.
3 4
Much of the confusion surrounding the theory of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations comes, it is believed, from the underlying
notion seemingly prevalent that the exercise of any jurisdiction by a
state over a foreign corporation is an extraordinary and anomalous
thing in the law, to be explained only by fictions, implications and
sonorous analogies too literally applied. There must have been a
time when the jurisdiction of a court over a natural person seemed an
awesome thing, and it is doubted that any rule, full grown, was torn
from the skies by the judges to regulate the manner and limitations
of bringing persons before the court. A practice begun and con-
tinued grew to the proportions of law, which later received a con-
stitutional sanction in America. It is believed that the same sort
of development may be traced in the decisions of the Supreme Court
attempting to outline the method and limitations of bringing a for-
eign corporation before the court.
The notion that the corporation could only exist in the home state
made it seem that any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the for-
eign corporation was an onslaught against the settled rule forbidding
the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. It is believed that by
refusing to further countenance these outworn theories, supported
only by an ancient dictum, much will be gained in understanding our
problem. It is believed further that the cases decided by the Supreme
Court present a fairly consistent stream of jurisprudence from which
'a See a comment by F. S. Philbrick in 20 Ill. Law Rev. 281.
'See 34 Yale Law Journal, 328. Furthermore, a group operating together
for a common purpose does not necessarily have to be recognized by the State
as such to be amenable to suit. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America (1922), 259 U. S. 344; Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of
Railway Servants (1901), A. C. 426.
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emerges a workable and easily comprehensible theory of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations. The cases, it is submitted, may be prop-
erly divided for the sake of convenience into "normal" and "abnor-
mal" cases, despite the fact that the word "normal" may be the sub-
ject of verbal quibble.
First it is postulated that ultimately the state imposes jurisdiction
in all cases, without attempting to discover the origins of the author-
ity thus exerted. The power of the state is limited, however, by
international law, and by the Constitution. The sanction of the
latter, being evident and continuous in its operation, alone will be
considered.
It will probably be admitted that the usual method of service
upon an individual is by handing him a copy of the process while he
is within the state attempting to exercise jurisdiction over him.3 This
may be characterized as the "normal" method of service for the
rendering of a personal judgment. However, the person may consent
to that jurisdiction without the usual formality. Other methods are
possible because of the recognized power over-
(1) Its citizens, wherever they may be. 36
(2) Persons domiciled within- the state, though they be tempor-
arily abroad,37 and because of-
(3) The power of the state to protect its own legitimate inter-
ests within constitutional limitations. 38
When corporations first came before the courts in America, those
courts were somewhat undecided ag to the proper manner of bring-
ing such organizations into court, the greatest trouble being with
foreign corporations. It was thought by some courts that the com-
mon law provided no method for the court to get jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation, and that a statute was necessary.3 9 The doctrine
of the Supreme Court that the corporation could not exist outside
the creating state, and the ruling that persons owing no allegiance to
a state were immune from the jurisdiction of that state unless caught
personally within its boundaries, presented seemingly insuperable
constitutional obstacles to the court's taking jurisdiction over any
" Western Loan Co. v. Butte &c. Co. (1908), 210 U. S. 368.
"New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy (1915), 241 U. S. 518, but com-
pare Mabee v. McDonald (1916), 243 U. S. 90.
" Ousley v. Lehigh Valley &c. Co. (C. C., E. D., Pa. 1897), 84 Fed. 602.
'Hess v. Pawloski, note 1, supra.
Henderson, op. cit., pp. 77-78.
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foreign corporation. These difficulties were overcome, however, by
the passage of statutes which were upheld under the ingenious theory
of consent. The first acts were carefully framed to avoid constitu-
tional difficulties, 40 but many modern statutes simply provide for
service as upon domestic corporations, with added provisions for
cases where that method is impossible.
41
The only way that service may be had upon any corporation any-
where is by service upon an agent. Formerly service could be had
only upon the principal officer,42 but with the growth in size and
complexity of corporations, service upon any agent bearing a suffi-
ciently close relation to the corporation to meet the constitutional
requirements as to notice was allowed. Most of the states regulated
the service on corporations by statute, so that the question of whether
or n6t service could be had in the absence of an authorizing statute
became largely academic.
Thus it became the general custom to get jurisdiction over a cor-
poratiori by service upon one of the agents through whom it mani-
fested its existence. This manifestation of existence has been char-
acterized by the Supreme Court as "doing business." 48  The term
is obviously an expansive one, and it appears from the decisions that
a certain volume of "doing business" is required before the state
may acquire jurisdiction.44 In recent cases it is usually said that the
business must be done in "such a manner and to such an extent that
its (the corporation's) presence there is established. ' 45 As has been
previously noted, the word "presence" as applied to a corporation is
"Ibid., p. 80.
'E.g. Mass. Stats. 1913, Chap. 257, Sec. 1:
"In an action against a foreign corporation having its principal or a usual
place of business within this commonwealth, or which is engaged in or soliciting
business in this commonwealth, permanently or temporarily, and with or with-
out a usual place of business therein, service of the summons or writ may be
made according to the provisions of section thirty-six of chapter one hundred
and sixty-seven of the Revised Laws for service in actions against domestic
corporations; and such service shall be of the same effect and validity as if
made upon the .commissioner of corporations.""Henderson, op. cit., p. 77.
"As to what constitutes doing business see Osborne, Arising out of Busi-
ness Done in the State, 7 Minn. Law Rev. 380; 31 Yale Law Journal 205; and a
pamphlet entitled, What is Doing Business?, prepared by the Corporation Trust
Co. See comments in 5 N. C. L. Rev. 159, 361; 6 N. C. L. Rev. 93.
"Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry. (1907), 205 U. S. 530; St. Louis, S. W. Ry. v.
Alexander (1913), 227 U. S. 218; Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923),
261 U. S. 171; James-Dickinson Mfg. Co. v. Harry (1927), 47 Sup. Ct. 308;
and cf. Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ass'n. (1910), 218 U. S. 573.
"Brandeis, J., in Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923), 261 U. S. 173.
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objectionable to many--certainly it furnishes no complete objective
test capable of the same application by everyone. As a matter of
fact, it has long been the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court that
the question of doing business must in each case be decided upon the
facts of the particular case, and that the question is always a Federal
one.46 The use of the word "presence" is therefore unnecessary,
and perhaps misleading, since it suggests an objective test where sub-
jective tests are always used. An objective test seems impossible in
these cases, and no reason is perceived why the subjective test may
not continue to be properly employed.
If it be assumed that the foreign corporation is doing the sort
of business which in the opinion of the Supreme Court brings the
corporation within the jurisdiction of the state, no reason is per-
ceived why the corporation would not be subjected to that jurisdiction
for all causes of action that a natural foreign person in the state
would be. The customary method of service on such a foreign cor-
poration, as has been noted above, is by service upon one of the
agents of the corporation representing it in the business done there.
As was stated by the Supreme Court in Peterson v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry.
47
it is essential to the validity of such service that the corpor-
ation shall be doing business within the state, and that the service be
upon an agent representing the corporation with respect to such
business." 48
These are, it is submitted, the only constitutional essentials, i.e.
the doing of business in the state at the time of service, and service
upon an agent of the company representing it in such business.
When these essentials are met, it has been the practice of the Su-
preme Court to sustain the jurisdiction of the state courts to the
same extent as if foreign individuals were involved. Thus the rule
that transitory causes of action may be sued upon wherever a court
may be found with jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter applies as well to a foreign corporation as to a foreign indi-
Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Real Estate Trust (1915), 238 U. S. 185; St.
Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander (1913), 227 U. S. 218.
"(1907) 205 U. S. 364.Ibid, p. 394.
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vidual. 49 And no statute specifically authorizing a particular method
of service in such jurisdiction is necessary.50
Both Fead and Scott maintain the view that service upon the
representative agent of a foreign corporation doing business within
the state is probably not due process of law, as to causes of action
arising outside the state.51 The opinion is based upon their inter-
pretation of Simon v. Southern Ry.52 and Old Wayne Mutual Life
Ass'n. v. McDonough,53 and is tinctured seemingly by a general view
that jurisdiction over the foreign corporation is unusual and to be
explained in any case only upon some well recognized necessity of
the state. The decisions being based, in their opinion, upon the
hardship to the defendant corporation, the same reasoning would
apply to invalidate service upon the voluntary agent. It must be
remembered that in the Simon and Old Wayne cases the service was
upon a state officer designated by statute, which type of service
would not come within the "normal" rule. The court therefore ap-
proached the problem from the standpoint of the state's police power,
an approach which would not have been necessary had the facts fallen
within the "normal" rule as stated in Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Is-
land & Pacific Ry., supra.
"Day, J., in A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers (1909), 213, U. S. 55.
. . . An action for personal injuries is universally held to be transitory,
and maintainable wherever a court may be found that has jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter." See also the following cases: Stewart v. B. &
0. Ry. Co. (1897), 168 U. S. 445; Northern Pacific Ry. v. Babcock (1894),
154 U. S. 190; New York &c. Ry. v. Estill (1893), 147 U. S. 591; Dennick v.
Railroad Co. (1880), 103 U. S. 11; Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Ry. (1907), 205 U. S. 364; In re Hohorst (1893), 150 U. S. 653; Reynolds v.
M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1920), 255 U. S. 565. Cf. Haskell v. Aluminum Co. of
America (D. C. Mass.), 14 F (2d) 864.
r' Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane (1898), 170 U. S. 100; Connecticut Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley (1899), 172 U. S. 602, 618; Railroad Co. v.
Harris (1870), 12 Wall. 65.
5 Scott, article cited, p. 579, note 40; Fead, article cited, pp. 646-647.
Two cases decided before the Supreme Court passed on Reynolds v. M. K. &
T. Ry., supra, took the view that the decision in the Simon case and the Old
Wayne applied to the service upon a voluntarily appointed agent. Takacs v.
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. (S. D., N. Y. 1915), 228 Fed. 728; Fry v. Denver
& Rio Grande Ry. (N. D. Cal. 1915), 226 Fed. 893. The opposite view, how-
ever, was taken in the other jurisdictions where the matter came up. Hoffman
v. Railroad Co. (D. C. 1916), 44 App. D. C. 419; El Paso & S. W. R1,. v.
Chisoln (Tex. 1915), 180 S. W. 156; Tauaa v. Susquehana Coal Co. (1917),
220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915; A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Weeks (W. D. Tex. 1918),
248 Fed. 970; Reynolds v. M. K. & T. Ry. (1917). 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E.
913, affirmed (1920) 255 U. S. 565; Rishniller v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry.
(1916), 134 Minn. 261; 157 N. W. 272.
(1914) 236 U. S. 115.
(1906) 204 U. S. 8.
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Both Fead and Scott state that the Supreme Court has not yet
passed upon the question, entirely overlooking the case of Reynolds
v. M. K. & T. Ry.,54 where service upon the voluntarily appointed
agent of the corporation doing business in the state was upheld, even
though the cause of action arose outside the state. In that case the
suit was upon certain notes executed and payable outside of Massa-
chusetts. Service was upon the general agent of the corporation
within the state in conformity with the Massachusetts statute, which
provided simply that foreign corporations doing business in the state
were subject to service in the same manner as domestic corpor-
ations. 55 As was later said, however, by Justice Brandeis in Davis
v. Farmer's Coiperative Co.,56 the only constitutional objection
.asserted in the Reynolds case was that of due process, it being inti-
mated that a service perfectly valid under the due process clause
might fall as a violation of the commerce clause.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Reynolds case simply
followed the previous practice as exemplified in Barrow Steamship
Co. v. Kane, supra; Bennick v. Railroad;57 In re Hohorst;58 New
York &c. Ry. v. Estill;59 and Railroad Co. v. Harris.60
In the Barrow Steamship Co. case the suit was against a British
corporation by a New Jersey citizen for a tort committed in Irish
territorial waters. Service was upon the regularly appointed agents
of the defendant in New York and suit begun in the Federal district
court there. Under the New York statute such service was expressly
negatived, and had the defendant been an American corporation the
Federal Judiciary Act would have applied to prevent the Federal
court from taking jurisdiction. 61 This Federal act, however, was
held not to apply to other than American corporations. There was
therefore no express statute providing for the service upon the
- (1920) 255 U. S. 565. A per curiam opinion affirming two cases below.
Reynolds v. M. K. & T. Ry., 224 Mass. 379, 113 N. E. 413; and 228 Mass. 584,
117 N. E. 913. The plaintiff's brief shows that the matter of the cause of action
arising outside of Massachusetts was fully argued before the court.
'The facts are given in the decision below. 228 Mass. 584, 117 N. E. 913.
(1923) 262 U. S. 312, 318. It may be noted that the plaintiff in the
Reyvnolds case, supra, was a citizen of Massachusetts.
(1880) 103 U. S. 11.
(1893) 150 U. S. 653.
(1893) 147 U. S. 591.
(U. S. 1870) 12 Wall. 65.
See In re Keasby & Mattison Co. (1895), 160 U. S. 221; and Galveston
&c. Ry. v. Gonzales (1894), 151 U. S. 496. The Federal Judiciary Act was held
inapplicable to an alien corporation, (i.e. one formed outside the United States)
in In re Hohorst (1893), 150 U. S. 653.
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agent, yet the jurisdiction of the court was upheld on the general
grounds that a statute authorizing service upon a regularly appointed
agent was not necessary for that method of service to be properly
employed. The court had general jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter; the corporation was doing business within the jurisdiction;
service was upon the authorized agent carrying on the business there
-all that was essential for the jurisdiction of the court to attach.
In Dennick z. Railroad Co., supra, both parties were foreign to
the jurisdiction and the cause of action arose elsewhere, yet the
jurisdiction of the court was not questioned. The court said:
"Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law of a state, a
right of action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that
liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any
court which has jurisdiction of such matters and can obtain juris-
diction of the parties."' 6
2
In the instant case the rule as to transitory causes of action was thus
specifically held to apply to a defendant foreign corporation.
In re Hohorst, supra, presents a case similar in facts to the
Barrow Steanship Co. case. The action was for infringement of
patent; the defendant a German corporation; service upon the vol-
untarily appointed New York agents. Under the Federal Judiciary
Act the court could not have taken jurisdiction, for the corporation
was not an "inhabitant" or "resident" of the district within the
meaning of the act. The court disposed of the difficulty by holding
that the act was applicable only as to corporations of one of the
states of the United States. The jurisdiction was sustained on the
ground that the corporation was doing business in the district and
the agent served was a proper one under the general rule. Here
again the methods of service had the sanction of no express statute,
the court taking jurisdiction because of the existence of the essentials
announced in the Barrow case.
In New York &c. Ry. v. Estill, supra, the defendant was a New
York corporation, and service was had upon the general agent of the
defendant in St. Louis. The cause of action arose out of a tort com-
mitted in Ohio. The company was found to be doing business in
Missouri, but had appointed no particular agent to receive process
of service. The jurisdiction was sustained.
(1880) 103 U. S. 11, 18.
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Likewise, the jurisdiction of the courts of the District of Columbia
was sustained with respect to a cause of action arising out of a tort
committed in Maryland in Railroad Co. v. Harris, supra. Service
was upon the president of the corporation who transacted its busi-
ness within the District. The only District of Columbia statute
possibly applicable simply authorized the defendant to do business
within the District. It having done so, jurisdiction was properly
got by serving the president within the jurisdiction.
In three of these cases there was no statute outlining a method
of service, plainly indicating that in the Supreme Court's view no
such statute is essential. The five cases outlined above, it is sub-
mitted, are representative "normal" ones, and by no means anomalous.
From them we may deduce the following:
(1) The state has general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
doing business within the state through its regularly appointed agents.
(2) The normal method of bringing such a corporation into court,
either by statute or otherwise, is by service of process on the regu-
larly and voluntarily appointed agent engaged in that business within
the jurisdiction.
When the state has general jurisdiction over the foreign corpor-
ation, and the latter is properly brought into court as specified in
(2), it is immaterial, in transitory causes of action, where the cause
of action arose. The general rules applicable to a "person" properly
before the court would alone be relevant.
With this view of the "normal" case in mind, we may pass to
an examination of the "abnormal" cases. As has been said by the
Supreme Court, jurisdiction is a matter of force,63 and the state
may impose it up to the point where some constitutional inhibition
intervenes to restrain the activity of the state. We have previously
noted the "normal" and "abnormal" jurisdiction imposed upon
natural persons. With respect to corporations we have added to the
inhibitions of the due process clause those of the commerce clause.
64
It will not be necessary to consider cases arising under statutes
providing simply for service upon an agent of the corporation ac-
ceptable to the Supreme Court, for they would fall under the "nor-
mal" rule. Many statutes, however, provide for service either upon
some person wholly unconnected with the corporation, or upon some
'Michigan Tran. Co. v. Ferry (1912), 228 U. S. 346, 353.
"See Davis v. Farmer's Co-operative Co. (1923), 262 U. S. 312, and cf.
Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope (1914), 235 U. S. 197.
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employee of the corporation whose relation to the latter is in the
nature of a servant rather than an agent.64a Or the statute may pro-
vide for this type of service even after the corporation has ceased to
do business in the state. In cases arising under these statutes,
jurisdiction must be upheld, if at all, under the police power. The
limitations on this exercise of the police power by the state have been
sufficiently considered by the Supreme Court to make certain gen-
eralizations possible.
First, the state may not impose its jurisdiction upon a corporation
which is not then doing, and which had never done, business within
the state. 65 This, however, would probably not apply in cases where
the corporation had expressly contracted to submit to jurisdiction
even in such a case. 66
Second, the state may properly provide for service upon a state
officer unconnected with the corporation, if the company is doing
business in the state. 7 It is probable, however, that if no duty were
imposed upon such state officer to notify the corporation, the statute
would be unconstitutional. 67 If the corporation expressly appoints
the state agent as its agent for service, the causes of actior; which
may be heard by the state courts will depend on the construction of
the statute.0 8 But if the corporation does not expressly appoint the
state agent to receive service, there is nothing to sustain the juris-
diction of the state save its bare power. In such case the state may
constitutionally exercise that power only as to causes of action aris-
ing out of business done in the state.6 9
The same considerations would seemingly apply to statutes desig-
nating agents whose relation to the corporation is too remote to meet
the constitutional requirements as to notice. Here, as in the case of
the state agent, the state attempts to impose a relation not previously
existing and against the will of the corporation. If the corporation
makes an express appointment, it is bound by the terms of its con-
" Cf. Insurance Co. v. Societa de Navigazione etc. (1914), 111 L. T. 97;
and Rendleman v. Niagra Sprayer Co., 16 F. (2d.) 122 for a consideration of
who is an "agent."
Kendall v. American Automatic Loon Co. (1905), 198 U. S. 477.
Such is the implication of Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining Co. (1917), 243 U. S. 93.
"Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Ass'n. (1910), 218 U. S. 573.
'*See Simon v. Southern Ry. (C. C. A. 5th.), 184 Fed. 959.
"Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co. (1917), 243
U. S. 93.
Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n. v. McDonough (1906), 204 U. S. 8.
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tract,70 but if no such appointment is made the power of the state
is limited to causes of action arising out of business done in the state.
Though all the business done in the state may be in interstate
commerce, the state still has general jurisdiction over the corpor-
ation.7 1 Yet the fact that such business is all in interstate commerce
places the additional limitation upon the state that the jurisdiction
exercised by it must not impose an unreasonable burden upon inter-
state commerce. In Davis v. Farmer's Codperative Co.,72 a Minne-
sota statute attempted to impose jurisdiction as to all causes of action
as a condition precedent to the foreign corporation's maintaining a
mere soliciting agent in the state. This was held to be an unreason-
able interference with interstate commerce and therefore invalid.
That the statute simply went too far in its terms is indicated by the
statement of Justice Brandeis that
"It may be that a statute like that here assailed would be valid
though applied to suits in which the cause of action arose elsewhere,
if the transaction out of which it arose had been entered upon within
the state, or if the plaintiff was, when it arose, a resident of the
state."
73
That is, if there had been a reasonable connection between the
statute and the state's police power, the interference with interstate
commerce would not have been unreasonable.
Finally, the cases where the corporation attempts to revoke an
appointment made for service, or where it ceases to do business in
the state remain to be considered. The language of the Supreme
" Sviolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. (S. D., N. Y., 1915),
222 Fed. 148, and Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co.
(1917), 243 U. S. 93.International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (1914), 234 U. S. 579.
7- (1923) 262 U. S. 312. It is doubtful if the corporation was "doing busi-
ness" here in view of the previous holdings of the court. Cf. Green v. C. B.
& Q. Ry. (1907), 205 U. S. 530, where it was held that mere solicitation was
not "doing business" of the nature required for jurisdiction.
73 262 U. S. 312, 316.
An attempt has been made to classify the cases in which the corporation
should be held subject to the jurisdiction of the State, by using Mr. Beale's
theory of "primary" and "secondary" obligations. This theory is used for the
purposes of finding a basis for jurisdiction in more than one State. (Osborne,
"Arising out of Business Done in the State," 7 Minn. Law Rev. 380. See also
Fead, article cited, p. 648). If the classification be limited to those cases here
classified as "abnormal," it would doubtless serve a useful purpose, but if it be
intended to apply the classification to all cases, then, it is submitted, the classifi-
cation works from a premise which probably cannot be supported by modem
cases-i.e. that any jurisdiction exercised by the State over a foreign corpora-
tion is a strange and anomalous thing, requiring in every case some sort of
special explanation.
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Court for a long time indicated that if the service and the doing of
business were not coincident in time in all cases the jurisdiction would
not be sustained. The language of the court changed in Mutual Re-
serve Insurance Co. v. Phelps,74 though the court specifically held in
that case that the company was still doing business in the state even
though it had been theoretically ousted. It is believed that in every
case prior to American Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co.,7 5 the
Supreme Court first found that the corporation was doing business
in the state at the time of service before the jurisdiction was upheld.
In the Royster Guano Co. case it appears that the defendant corpor-
ation had actually ceased to do business in the state, and service upon
a state official was upheld on the ground that the cause of action
arose within the state during the time when the corporation was doing
business there. It is believed that such a result is sound, for it
would seem clearly within the police power of the state to impose a
continuing liability for acts done within its borders.
The same result is reached in cases where an actual appointment
has been made and the appointment later revoked. The revocation
will be valid as to causes of action arising outside the state,70 but
not as to those arising out of business done within the state.7 7 Even
though the appointed agent's authority is not revoked, when the cor-
poration actually ceases to do business in the state the same rules
seemingly apply. 78
Thus, in the so-called "abnormal" cases the validity or non-valid-
ity of the jurisdictional assumptions of the state will depend upon
whether or not the jurisdiction complained of is reasonably designed
to protect the legitimate interests of the state, and therefore a proper
exercise of the police power.
A strong argument has been made, upon grounds of justice and
convenience, against the validity of service upon the voluntarily
appointed agent of the corporation engaged in carrying on the latter's
business within the state as to causes of action arising outside the
state.79 While granting that the rule may often operate to cause
hardship on corporations, it is submitted that there are strong argu-
(1903) 190 U. S. 147.
(1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 355.
"Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden-Breck Co. (1921), 257 U. S. 184; Hunter
v. Mutual Reserve Life Assn. (1910), 218 U. S. 573.
'I International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (1914), 234 U. S. 579.
" Chipman v. Jeffery Co. (1920), 251 U. S. 373.
Fead, Article cited, p. 650, note 63.
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ments to be made on behalf of the plaintiff individual for the retention
of the rule that transitory causes of action may be sued upon wherever
jurisdiction may be got over the defendant and the subject matter.
It is said that when a corporation does business in several states the
plaintiff would have the privilege of choosing the jurisdiction most
favorable to him. The argument, to be of any great weight, would
have to assume that the state chosen by the plaintiff was not disposed
to decide cases justly and legally-an argument which would prob-
ably find little favor with the Supreme Court. On the other hand,
it is to be remembered that the corporation has the privilege of
choosing the state of its incorporation. Ordinarily the jurisdiction
most favorable to it would be chosen, and as a plaintiff, if our rule
be denied, would in many cases be forced to go to that jurisdiction,
it is plain that the argument of choice is capable of being used as to
both parties.
The argument that the corporation would be put to great expense
and inconvenience by having to transport documentary evidence and
witnesses from one state to another also works both ways. The plain-
tiff cannot leave his home state for the trial of a cause of action
abroad without incurring considerable of the same kind of extra ex-
pense, and the plantiff can no more compel the presence of foreign
witnesses than can the corporation. In many cases, as will be later
shown, this type of hardship would be forced on both parties if the
rule as to transitory causes of action be denied application to
corporations.
Suppose a Delaware corporation, doing business in New Mexico
and Oklahoma is excluded from doing business in Texas for breach
of anti-trust laws, and it actually does no business there. Its trucks
carry materials between New Mexico and Oklahoma across the Texas
Panhandle. X is negligently injured by one of the trucks, and Texas
has no such statute as Massachusetts has for imposing liability
within the state. Why should X be forced to go all the way to
Delaware to sue the corporation, instead of being allowed to sue in
the nearest state in which the defendant does business? It is diffi-
cult to see how the defendant would be benefitted by being forced
to defend the action in a state where its only operations consist in the
maintenance of transfer books. Both plaintiff and defendant would
be highly inconvenienced, yet if the rule be discarded, such a result
is inevitable.
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We may suppose a Delaware corporation, whose only activity
is the operation of a canning plant for food in Illinois. Food is
shipped in interstate commerce to jobbers in Missouri. The food is
tainted and causes a number of deaths in Missouri. The defendant
corporation does no business there, so that the Missouri courts cannot
get jurisdiction. What social purpose, it may be asked, is served by
sending the representatives of the deceased to Delaware to bring their
suits ?
Or to take a case in contract, which may more often arise than
the tort cases mentioned above. Suppose that an oil producing cor-
poration is incorporated in New Jersey, and confines its operations
to Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas. The company borrows money in
St. Louis and executes notes payable there. The notes are not paid.
Any property which the plaintiff might attach as belonging to the
company is located in one of the three states where the corporation
does business, yet he would be forced to go to New Jersey to bring
suit on the notes. He would then have to go to the further trouble
and expense of bringing new actions in one of the states where the
corporations property was located to get execution on his judgment.
How much more simple for both parties if the action had been
brought in one of the states where the company was doing business!
Discard the rule, and in every case where the cause of action arose in
a state where the foreign corporation did no business both parties
would be forced to a jurisdiction which more often than not is but
the fictive "domicile" of the corporation.
In all the cases above mentioned the corporation would be put
to practically as much expense and inconvenience-perhaps more-
as the plaintiff, for there would probably be nothing belonging to the
corporation in its "home" state save its charter and transfer books.
Both parties would be benefitted by the action being brought in the
nearest state in which the corporation does business.
When it becomes evident that the rule may work hardship in
both directions, we do not see that imperative consideration of public
policy which alone would warrant the overturning of an established
practice of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the general
policy of our law is to favor the individual as against the corporation
when it appears that one of them must bear a loss or an inconven-
ience and both are equally innocent of wrong. A somewhat different
policy might arise with reference to public service corporations.
where the corporate earnings are limited in favor of the public.
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This would be particularly so in cases like Davis v,. Farmer's Co-
operative Co., supra, where the utility was being operated by the
government. In the subject here under discussion, it must be remem-
bered that the corporation large enough to carry on business in a
sufficiently large number of states to give an individual plaintiff any
real choice, is usually large enough to maintain a legal department,
or at least retain counsel to represent it generally, and is usually
well prepared to meet and defend causes of action in any state where
it does business. Further the corporation is in a position to dis-
tribute what little extra loss it may suffer from being forced to de-
fend causes of action away from the state of its incorporation, while
the individual plaintiff would have to bear alone the inconvenience
and hardship that would result if he were forced to go to the cor-
poration's home state to sue. When, in addition to the reasons just
given, it appears that, in order to free the corporation from suits
arising out of actions committed outside the jurisdiction in question,
an established rule of the conflict of laws, and a long standing prac-
tice of the courts would have to be thrown overboard, we may well
hesitate to subscribe to the arguments criticized above.
It is believed that just results will be reached if each fact case be
approached as a "normal" or "abnormal" one. No fictions or impli-
cations need be resorted to. This sort of approach, it is believed,
accounts for the difference in decision between the case of Simon v.
Southern Ry., supra, and that in Reynolds v. M. K. & T. Ry., supra.
In the former case, the method of service was an abnormal one, and
the decision rested on a limitation of the state's police power; in the
latter, the facts fell within the "normal" situation as previously de-
scribed, and the police power of the state did not come into question,
so there was no necessity for looking into the relative hardships or
attempting to find some legitimate interest of the state which might
properly be served by allowing the jurisdiction. The cases here
spoken of as "abnormal" have nothing to do with the conflict of laws
(the rules of which are illustrated by the cases called "normal"), but
are concerned with the efforts of the state to abrogate rules of the
conflict of laws which have been given constitutional sanction by the
Supreme Court.
